

1 On the unreasonable reliability of 2 mathematical inference¹

3 In (Avigad, 2020), Jeremy Avigad makes a novel and insightful argument, which he presents as part
4 of a defence of the ‘Standard View’ about the relationship between informal mathematical proofs
5 (that is, the proofs that mathematicians write for each other and publish in mathematics journals,
6 which may in spite of their ‘informal’ label be rather more formal than other kinds of scientific
7 communication) and their corresponding formal derivations (‘formal’ in the sense of computer
8 science and mathematical logic). His argument considers the various strategies by means of which
9 mathematicians can write informal proofs that meet mathematical standards of rigour, in spite of
10 the prodigious length, complexity and conceptual difficulty that some proofs exhibit. He takes it that
11 showing that and how such strategies work is a necessary part of any defence of the Standard View.

12 In this paper, I argue for two claims. The first is that Avigad’s list of strategies is no threat to critics
13 of the Standard View. On the contrary, this observational core of heuristic advice in Avigad’s paper
14 is agnostic between rival accounts of mathematical correctness. The second is that that Avigad’s
15 project of accounting for the relation between formal and informal proofs requires an answer to a
16 prior question: what sort of thing is an informal proof? His paper havers between two answers. One
17 is that informal proofs are ultimately syntactic items that differ from formal derivations only in
18 completeness and use of abbreviations. The other is that informal proofs are not purely syntactic
19 items, and therefore the translation of an informal proof into a derivation is not a routine procedure
20 but rather a creative act. Since the ‘syntactic’ reading of informal proofs reduces the Standard View
21 to triviality, makes a mystery of the valuable observational core of his paper, and underestimates the
22 value of the achievements of mathematical logic, he should choose some version of the second
23 option.

24 1. Two Views of Proof: history of the question

25 Avigad’s paper adds to a debate that can be traced to the origins of modern mathematics in the
26 early twentieth century. The historic division is between those like Hilbert² and the Bourbakists³
27 who wished to drive the modern tendency towards ever more formal and abstract mathematics to
28 its limit, and those like Poincaré⁴ and Brouwer⁵ who thought (in different ways) that mathematics
29 ineliminably refers to human experience and activity, and therefore judged that complete
30 formalisation is either unwise or impossible. This broad contrast developed into a debate over
31 (what we now call) the Standard View: that full formalisability is not merely a splendid and valuable
32 feature of mathematical proofs, but is a criterion or norm of rigour. For example, Saunders Mac

¹ I am grateful for valuable comments to two anonymous reviewers and to audience members at a conference in January 2021 organised by Silvia De Toffoli.

² See Hilbert (1927), especially pp. 472-4 of van Heijenoort (ed.) for his polemics against Poincaré and Brouwer. Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics is much richer than here presented, and includes a conception of finitary mathematics as contentful, that is, not wholly syntactic. See Zach (2019).

³ Bourbaki (1948).

⁴ Poincaré (1908). On his conception of proof, “*Verification* differs from proof precisely because it is analytical,... It leads to nothing because the conclusion is nothing but the premisses translated into another language. A real proof, on the other hand, is fruitful because the conclusion is in a sense more general than the premisses.” (1902, p. 396 in Benacerraf & Putnam). For a nuanced discussion of Poincaré’s views on formal logic, see McLarty (1997).

⁵ “The question where mathematical exactness does exist, is answered differently by the two sides; the intuitionist says: in the human intellect, the formalist says: on paper.” Brouwer (1913) p. 83.

33 Lane claimed that, “In practice, a proof is a sketch, in sufficient detail to make possible a routine
34 translation of this sketch into a formal proof” and that, “...the test for the correctness of a proposed
35 proof is by formal criteria and not by reference to the subject matter at issue” (1986 pp. 377-8).
36 Here is a looser statement from Thomas Hales,

37 The ultimate standard of proof is a formal proof, which is nothing other than an unbroken
38 chain of logical inferences from an explicit set of axioms. While this may be the
39 mathematical ideal of proof, actual mathematical practice generally deviates significantly
40 from the ideal. (2012, p. x)

41 Where Mac Lane describes the informal proof as a ‘sketch’, Hales writes (in the title of his book) of a
42 ‘blueprint’. Solomon Feferman, at the end of his (2012), sought to specify the relation between an
43 informal proof and a corresponding formal derivation without using such metaphors:

44 ...the Formalizability Thesis should be given a very strict reading, namely that (i) every good
45 proof has an underlying logical structure, (ii) that structure is completely analyzed in the
46 derivation that formalizes the proof, and, finally (iii) that derivation assures the correctness
47 of the theorem proved on the basis of the background assumptions expressed by the axioms
48 and rules of the system in which the proof is formalized.

49 For a more recent expression of the idea that proof is really about syntax, here is Joel D. Hamkins,

50 Proof and truth... lie on opposite sides of the syntax-semantics divide, for at bottom, a proof
51 is a kind of argument, a collection of assertions structured syntactically in some way, while
52 the truth of an assertion is grounded in deeply semantic issues concerning the way things
53 are... Proof... lies solidly on the syntactic side, since ideally one can verify and analyze a proof
54 as a purely syntactic object, without a concept of meaning and without ever interpreting the
55 language in any model. (2020, pp. 157-8)

56 In fairness, it should be noted that this quotation comes from an introductory lecture series in which
57 Hamkins outlines a range of perspectives and leaves the deeper questions that they raise for
58 students to discuss. Nonetheless, these examples are enough to show why this is called ‘the
59 Standard View’. It occurs in mathematicians’ discussions of proof, often with little or no supporting
60 argument, as if it were an unobjectionable statement of what all mathematicians mean by ‘proof’.
61 It is almost always joined with a recognition that reality rarely approaches this ideal (as in Mac Lane
62 and Hales, just quoted). Here is Hamkins, a few pages on: “Most contemporary mathematical proofs
63 are written in prose, essay-style... In mathematical practice, a proof is any sufficiently detailed
64 convincing mathematical argument that logically establishes the truth of a theorem from its
65 premises.” (p. 160). Students might wonder how prose, even mathematical prose, can ‘lie solidly on
66 the syntactic side’. In most of these presentations, the tension between the ideal of a purely
67 syntactic object and the reality of proofs written in semantically rich prose is either shrugged off or
68 set aside with a claim (as in Mac Lane) that the translation between informal proof and formal
69 derivation is ‘routine’ or otherwise unproblematic. Of course, some aspects of mathematical
70 argumentation are perfectly well modelled by formal logic. Every proof by contradiction, for
71 example, is a clear, undisguised case of *reductio ad absurdum*.

72 Some mathematicians do worry about in the relation between an informal proof and its
73 corresponding derivations,⁶ such as Reuben Hersh (1997) and most notably Yehuda Rav (1999). Rav
74 asked why we prove theorems, and his answers all turned on a claim that proofs include ‘topic-
75 specific moves’ (p. 26) that cannot be re-cast in formal logic without loss or violence. This is also a
76 central point for Hersh, “The passage from informal to formalized theory must entail loss of meaning
77 or change of meaning” (1997, p. 160). Mac Lane, in contrast, claims that if an informal proof is
78 rigorous, this translation must be ‘routine’ and that the test for correctness should made no
79 reference to the subject matter, that is, should not be topic-specific (quoted above).

80 Thus, we have some mathematicians (Hersh, Rav) insisting that informal proofs are often so
81 different from formal derivations that the latter have little relevance to the business of writing and
82 checking the former. Other mathematicians (Mac Lane, Feferman, perhaps Hales and Hamkins) sail
83 close to claiming that a rigorous informal proof in some sense *is* a formal derivation (‘at bottom’,
84 under ‘complete analysis’ or up to ‘routine’ translation). What, in this circumstance, is a philosopher
85 to do? One of the most widely discussed accounts of the matter is Jody Azzouni’s (2004)⁷
86 ‘derivation-indicator’ view.

87 Azzouni, seeking to specify a role for formal derivations while doing justice to the rich descriptions of
88 proof-practice that he found in Rav and others, argued that an informal proof is not a formal
89 derivation somehow abbreviated or disguised. Rather, a valid informal proof indicates the existence
90 of a formal derivation and in this way meets the norm of formal correctness. Azzouni later modified
91 this view (2009), giving up the phrase ‘derivation-indicator’ in favour of talk of topic-specific
92 inference packages that sound rather like Rav’s topic-specific moves. In spite of this partial
93 rapprochement, there are some important differences between Azzouni’s eventual position and
94 Rav’s outlook. Azzouni works hard in his (2009) paper to identify the role that formal logic has in
95 informal proof practice (see his discussion of ‘content containment’), and he ties his account to
96 human cognitive processes and capacities, whereas Rav talks about topic-specific mathematical
97 moves that might in principle be carried out by a cephalopod or an alien.

98 Azzouni’s chief motive for giving up the derivation-indicator view seems to be that he found himself
99 explaining observable, measurable social facts—the reliability and stability of mathematical
100 knowledge, the confidence of mathematicians in their results and the high degree of consensus in
101 the mathematical research community—by reference to something that in almost all cases is non-
102 existent:

103 I kept falling (against my will) into a view that mathematicians had to be engaged in
104 *something* like sophisticated syntactic pattern-recognition while perusing informal
105 mathematical proofs, so that they would be sensitive (without realizing it) to a background
106 of *nonexistent* formal derivations.⁸

107 Philosophers of the Rav tendency often rely on some version of this point. Formal derivations
108 corresponding to informal proofs almost never exist in material reality. They might be posited in
109 principle, and sometimes the structure of the informal proof might suggest a map of how a

⁶ Typically, there are lots of derivations that might formalise a given proof, and sometimes they vary sufficiently to make trouble for Feferman’s claim that *the* corresponding derivation captures *the* logical structure of the informal proof. See Tanswell (2015) for cases.

⁷ Azzouni modified his view considerably in his (2009) and (2017). Nevertheless, his phrase ‘derivation-indicator’ has taken on a life beyond his writing. Since Avigad’s most recent work is the focus of the present paper, it is worth noting that Azzouni lists Avigad among the acknowledgements of his (2009) paper.

⁸ Azzouni, 2009, p. 25. Italics in original.

110 derivation could be worked up. Nevertheless, the posited formal derivations almost always remain
111 materially non-existent and therefore ineligible to be elements in the causal history of a
112 psychological or social fact. Whatever job it is that formal derivations are supposed to do in
113 mathematical practice, they somehow must be able to do it without existing.⁹

114 There are two more points to make about this debate before turning to Avigad's recent paper. First,
115 practicing mathematicians supply the contending philosophical positions. The fact that
116 mathematicians feel moved to say what they do is part of the data for philosophers of mathematical
117 practice. In particular, philosophers who favour Rav's outlook need to explain why mathematicians
118 so often announce some version of the Standard View. It matters, even if it is strictly false.¹⁰ The
119 philosopher's work would not yet be complete if one side of this debate triumphed over the other,
120 because (whichever way it went), all the data must be accounted for, including the reflections of
121 mathematicians committed to the defeated view.

122 Second, notice how Azzouni got drawn (against his will) into making a claim in philosophy of mind.
123 The thought that informal proofs are really ('at bottom', after 'routine' translation) syntactic items
124 leads naturally to the idea that in reading them, mathematicians are doing some sort of syntactic
125 processing. This is a special case of the idea that all human thinking is syntactic processing, in spite
126 of appearances. That general idea owes some of its grip on the contemporary philosophical
127 imagination to the omnipresence of digital devices, which now carry out tasks that look as if they
128 belong solidly on the semantic side, but which are at bottom (at the level of machine-code),
129 syntactic processes. In addition, the brain-as-computer idea has a role in cognitive science because
130 it helps researchers to ask precise questions (about, for example, memory size and structure). It
131 may be also true, but results in experimental psychology suggest otherwise (Kahneman, 2012).
132 None of the authors cited in this paper have committed themselves to computationalism in the
133 philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, that is the direction in which these arguments point.

⁹ Of course, beliefs about non-existent formal derivations can be causally effective, and Azzouni makes moves in that direction in his (2017). There, he attempts to rescue his claim—that in reading an informal proof, mathematicians are unconsciously recognising algorithmic processes—by suggesting that the objects of the algorithms need not be linguistic strings. This thought is already in the literature, e.g., De Toffoli (2017), Giardino (2017), Larvor (2012), and Manders (2008) except that Azzouni re-presents manipulations as algorithmic processes. That may work for Azzouni, but it comes at the cost of separating his thesis (reading mathematical proofs is algorithm-recognition) from the idea that informal proofs are always-already formed in something like first-order logic with ZFC. He knows this, and makes moves to reconnect the two claims in the later sections of his paper.

¹⁰ This point has been raised in a helpfully clear way by Zoe Ashton (PhD thesis, forthcoming). It is not a topic of the present paper, but it is easy to see where one might start. Formalisation does all sorts of work in mathematics aside from securing proofs, such as sharpening and deepening ideas and preparing them for communication (see Hamkins pp. 162-3). It is distinctive of modern mathematics (roughly, Hilbert and after). Moreover, proof theory (the branch of formal logic) supplies mathematical models of mathematical reasoning. One might say that proof theory is what mathematics has to say about proof. It is not then surprising that it is also what many mathematicians have to say about proof. This is Hersh's line (1997 p. 154): the mathematician who insists on the Standard View is like the economist who forgets that his model of the economy is only a model. Hersh calls for the model to be tested. Perhaps current work on digital proof assistants is an answer to that call.

A philosopher in the Rav tendency might argue thus: mathematicians formalise, but the art of it is tacit knowledge. It is not a summatively assessed part of mathematical training (see Tatton-Brown (2020) for an account of how it is learned). Mathematicians who have entirely internalised the art of formalisation may feel that they're doing almost nothing, something 'routine', rather as a virtuoso jazz musician might insist that they're not thinking about music theory or technique while improvising.

134 To summarise: there is a tension in the Standard View arising from the differences between the ideal
135 of a wholly syntactic proof and the reality of informal proofs written essay-style in prose. Attempts
136 to resolve this tension pull philosophers and mathematicians towards claiming that informal proofs
137 are, in spite of appearances, not really informal. To a philosopher feeling this tension, informal
138 proofs can come to look like formal derivations in disguise, their underlying syntactic nature waiting
139 to be revealed by translation or analysis. From here, it is a short step to claiming that when
140 mathematicians read informal proofs they are really engaging in syntactic processing. With that step
141 taken, the philosopher of mathematics who began by trying to articulate the Standard View then
142 stands on the brink of making a commitment in the long-standing debate about whether the human
143 brain works like a digital computer. There may be an independent argument for the brain-as-
144 computer thesis, but it lies outside the philosophy of mathematical practice.

145 2. Avigad, J. [2020] Reliability of Mathematical Inference

146 The abstract of Avigad's paper reads as follows:

147 Of all the demands that mathematics imposes on its practitioners, one of the most
148 fundamental is that proofs ought to be correct. It has been common since the turn of the
149 twentieth century to take correctness to be underwritten by the existence of formal
150 derivations in a suitable axiomatic foundation, but then it is hard to see how this normative
151 standard can be met, given the differences between informal proofs and formal derivations,
152 and given the inherent fragility and complexity of the latter. This essay describes some of the
153 ways that mathematical practice makes it possible to reliably and robustly meet the formal
154 standard, preserving the standard normative account while doing justice to epistemically
155 important features of informal mathematical justification.

156 The first thing to note is that what we might call the 'observational core' of his argument—his partial
157 natural history of strategies for constructing sound informal proofs (sections 3 and 4 of his paper)—
158 is a significant and insightful contribution to the philosophy of mathematical practice, and will
159 remain so regardless of the fate of his larger argument.

160 To begin, consider Avigad's gloss on the Standard View:

161 According to the standard view, a mathematical statement is a theorem if and only if there is
162 a formal derivation of that statement, or, more precisely, a suitable formal rendering
163 thereof. When a mathematical referee certifies a mathematical result, then, whether or not
164 the referee recognizes it, the correctness of the judgement stands or falls with the existence
165 of such a formal derivation. (2020, p. 4)

166 It matters to what follows to get the modalities of this statement right. Avigad is not simply saying
167 that wherever there is a sound informal proof, there is as a matter of fact the possibility-in-principle
168 of writing a corresponding formal derivation. If that were the whole of the Standard View, there
169 would be little discussion because, as he points out, long-running programmes in the foundations of
170 mathematics give us compelling reasons to think that every sound informal proof can in principle be
171 supplied with a correct formal correlate, and what is more there is a growing library of formal
172 derivations of significant theorems. Avigad's claim is something stronger: correspondence with a
173 formal derivation is the very meaning of correctness for an informal proof. Throughout his paper, he
174 uses Azzouni's formulation that the existence of a derivation is the 'normative standard' for the
175 correctness of an informal proof. He rejects Detlefsen's suggestion that '[informal] rigor and
176 formalization are independent concerns', on the grounds that it 'requires us to provide an
177 independent characterization of rigor and provide some other explanation of what it means for an

178 informal proof to be correct.’ (2020, p. 6). It is evident from the dialectical context that he does not
179 expect this challenge to be met. On the other hand, he says nothing here about the relation
180 between the informal proof and its corresponding derivations (unlike Mac Lane’s insistence that the
181 translation between them must be ‘routine’ or Feferman’s requirement that the derivation is the
182 logical analysis of the informal proof).

183 The chief obstacle for the Standard View, according to Avigad, is to explain how informal proofs—
184 long, complex and difficult as they may be—can be the sort of things that entail the existence of
185 formal derivations. To meet this challenge, he deploys the observational core of his argument. Part
186 of his answer is that informal proofs (unlike formal derivations) do not have to be wholly error-
187 free—an informal proof can play its epistemic and logical roles even if it has small, easily fixed errors,
188 mistakes in book-keeping, mislabelling and the like (2020, p. 7). This robustness is in part due to the
189 stabilising role of the skilled mathematical reader, who can see the mistakes and figure out what
190 ought to have been printed. Avigad proceeds to develop the beginnings of a natural history of
191 desirable proof-features. He observes that proofs are modular—they divide into chunks that prove
192 lemmas, and the chunks can be passed around from proof to proof, so a new proof may rely on
193 some previously established modular parts that have already shown their reliability, and new
194 modular parts can be checked in isolation from the rest of the proof. Inferences in proofs are
195 motivated—a move in a proof is intelligible because it plays some part in the overall proof strategy,
196 which makes them easier for the reader to grasp. Avigad suggests three general strategies for
197 writing robust proofs:

- 198 • Isolate and minimize critical information
- 199 • Maximize exposure to error detection
- 200 • Leverage redundancy.

201 The working-through of a proof may involve a lot of standard moves, and a proof written for
202 robustness will downplay this familiar material in order to foreground whatever is novel or unique,
203 so that readers can focus on it and interrogate it. The second point means building in checks so that
204 an error will show up vividly. Finally, the robustness of informal proofs depends in part on the fact
205 that there are often many different ways of proving the same lemma or result. Avigad then suggests
206 a non-exhaustive list of some more specific heuristics:

- 207 1. Reason by analogy
- 208 2. Modularize
- 209 3. Generalize
- 210 4. Use algebraic abstraction
- 211 5. Collect examples
- 212 6. Classify
- 213 7. Develop complementary approaches
- 214 8. Visualize

215 The analogies Avigad has in mind can be between structures (say between the integers and the
216 Gaussian integers), or arguments, or construction heuristics like embedding a class of objects into a
217 bigger structure with more tractable properties. By ‘algebraic abstraction’, Avigad means capturing
218 the mathematically important features of a structure in axioms, such as the group axioms. These
219 heuristics can support each other. For example, collecting examples is an obvious precursor to
220 classification, but a classification can be more powerful if it is ordered according to some structural
221 feature, and this feature may be a candidate for capture in axioms, and so become a case of

222 algebraic abstraction.¹¹ Avigad supplies examples and discussion that I will not reproduce here
223 because I have nothing critical or novel to say about the detail of what I am calling the ‘observational
224 core’ of his paper.¹² Note, though, that these strategies all depend to some degree on the
225 mathematics being meaningful to human mathematicians. Some (such as 2 and 4) carry over to
226 formal derivations relatively smoothly. Others, such as 8, do not. Curiously, Avigad does not explore
227 the extent to which these strategies for informal proofs do or do not tend to produce proofs that
228 map easily (‘routinely’) across to formal derivations. On the contrary, he presents these strategies as
229 means for managing logical relations internal to the informal proof. They are not about building
230 connections between the informal proof and a corresponding formal derivation.¹³ They are about
231 making sure that the informal proof works in its own terms.

232 This is why the observational core of Avigad’s paper could just as well have been written by
233 someone building on the views of Yehuda Rav or Michael Detlefsen, that is to say, the claim that the
234 rigour of informal proofs can (on the whole, in most cases) be accounted for without reference to
235 formal derivations. Avigad’s analysis does not directly explain how informal proofs meet the
236 standard of correctness set out in the Standard View. His analysis cannot do that because it does
237 not mention formal derivations at all. Rather, it explains (or at least, begins to explain) how it is that
238 informal proofs can be truth-preserving. In doing so, it indirectly helps us to understand how they
239 meet the formalisability norm set out in Avigad’s reading of the Standard View—but only because
240 results in the foundations of mathematics tell us that a sound informal proof will be formalisable.
241 Informal mathematical proofs are highly truth-preserving in part because they isolate critical
242 information, expose themselves to error detection, leverage redundancy, and so on through the rest
243 of Avigad’s good heuristic advice. The observational core of Avigad’s paper can be adopted
244 wholesale by critics of the Standard View, because it says nothing about the alleged relation
245 between informal proofs and formal derivations. Apart from a few references to a paper by Hamami
246 (2019), Avigad’s heuristic observations are entirely about informal proofs alone, not about their
247 relation to derivations. The indifference of Avigad’s heuristics to formal derivations rather supports
248 the thought that the practically effective norm for mathematical proofs is that they should be sound.

249 That said, the challenge that Avigad presents to the Rav tendency remains, namely, to provide some
250 alternative account of the correctness of informal proofs. After all, most of Avigad’s heuristics would
251 be good advice for legal or historical argument (slot in sub-arguments that have already been well
252 tested, find multiple arguments for the same conclusion, etc.) and almost all of it is good advice for
253 philosophers (collect examples, classify, identify abstract principles, etc.). The challenge for the Rav
254 tendency is to explain how informal proofs attain mathematical levels of reliability, and this cannot
255 be achieved by only pointing to general heuristics of this sort. Some in the Rav tendency have
256 proposals, but testing them is not the aim of the present paper.¹⁴ Proponents of the strongest
257 version of the Standard View—that sound informal proofs are formal derivations in disguise—can
258 turn to formal logic to explain how proofs work, but do have to make their core thesis plausible in
259 the face of Avigad’s worry about fragility, Azzouni’s worry about how mathematicians engage with

¹¹ Some anecdotal corroboration for some of these points may be found here:

<https://mathoverflow.net/questions/338607/why-doesnt-mathematics-collapse-even-though-humans-quite-often-make-mistakes-in>

¹² I will indulge in a joke about the creative tension between 3 and 5. There are two sorts of mathematicians: the ones who, when presented with a new mathematical structure ask, ‘What is an example of this?’ and the ones who ask, ‘What is this an example of?’

¹³ I owe this observation to a comment by Dirk Schlimm at the 2020 meeting of the Association for the Philosophy of Mathematical Practice, during the Q&A of Avigad’s presentation of his paper.

¹⁴ See Larvor (2012, 2019).

260 derivations and fact that informal proofs and derivations look different and seem to work differently.
261 Someone who wishes to defend the Standard View without claiming that informal proofs are only
262 superficially informal would face the same challenge as the Rav tendency. If we allow that informal
263 proofs are not merely syntactic objects disguised in human language, then the challenge that Avigad
264 presents to the Rav tendency is the very problem that he addresses in his paper. I will argue in the
265 next section that Avigad equivocates between these two versions of the Standard View.

266 This completes the case for the first claim of this paper: that the observational core of heuristic
267 advice in Avigad’s paper is entirely agnostic between rival accounts of mathematical correctness.

268 3. The syntactic side of the tension

269 I now move to the second claim of this paper, that the tension at the heart of the Standard View is
270 still there in Avigad’s version and sometimes pushes him towards radical theses in philosophy of
271 mind. Recall how that temptation goes: informal proofs and formal derivations often look quite
272 different, and in any case the formal derivation corresponding to a proof is almost never produced.
273 Nevertheless, according to the Standard View, the existence of formal derivations is somehow
274 normative for informal proofs. A tempting resolution is to argue that in spite of appearances, the
275 informal proof is really a derivation in disguise. Then, two problems for the Standard View—the
276 non-existence of derivations and their apparent difference in kind from informal proofs—both
277 disappear. In that case, ‘routine’ translation and faithful logical analysis do not transform a proof
278 but merely reveal its essence. Once this line has been taken, it is natural to adopt a computational
279 view of the mathematical mind. Since mathematicians are humans, a general computationalism in
280 the philosophy of mind beckons.

281 As we saw, Avigad’s characterisation of the Standard View does not describe the relation between
282 informal proofs and formal derivations, but he does offer some clues in the body of his paper. Near
283 the start of his paper, Avigad adopts the familiar image of informal proofs as sketches, and Azzouni’s
284 language of derivation indication:

285 On the standard view, [informal proofs] are only high-level sketches that are intended to
286 indicate the existence of formal derivations. But providing less information only exacerbates
287 the problem... (2020, p. 4)

288 Avigad does not unpack the sketch analogy, but he does recommend Yacin Hamami’s (2019) which
289 does exactly that.¹⁵ Echoing Mac Lane, Hamami writes: ‘a mathematical proof is rigorous if and only
290 if it can be *routinely translated* into a formal proof.’¹⁶ The central part of Hamami’s paper is a careful
291 specification what he thinks ‘routine translation’ has to mean for the Standard View to be cogent:

292 ...the notion of translation in the standard view is quite different from the one of linguistic
293 translation. ...a better analogy would be with the process of compilation, that is, with the
294 ‘translation’ of a computer program written in a high-level programming language into
295 machine language.¹⁷

296 Hamami distinguishes four levels of ‘code’ linked by three stages of ‘compilation’. The essential
297 point is that on his view (which Avigad sometimes suggests he shares), the ‘routine translation’ of
298 informal proof into formal derivation that the Standard View requires is not like translating a
299 meaningful text from one human language to another. It is, rather, like the use of syntactic

¹⁵ Avigad says that, ‘Hamami’s model is essentially correct...’ (2020, p. 15). ‘Essentially’ here warns us not to hold Avigad responsible for every nuance of Hamami’s elaboration of the Standard View.

¹⁶ From the abstract. Italics in original.

¹⁷ Hamami credits this analogy to Gil Kalai (Kalai 2008). (Hamami 2019, p. 30).

300 substitutions to move from a high-level computer language where a programmer can call an
301 arbitrarily large and complex subroutine with a single command down to the level just above the
302 firmware. ‘Routine’ here does not mean ‘easy for humans’ or even ‘feasible for humans’. It means
303 that a digital machine could do it. It also means that, layers of compilation and syntactic
304 abbreviation notwithstanding, informal proofs and formal derivations are essentially the same sort
305 of thing. In other words, in Hamami (though not directly in Avigad), we find the strong version of the
306 Standard View, that sound informal proofs are syntactic items in disguise.

307 Avigad offers some other analogies in the same vein:

308 ...an informal proof is a form of data compression. Coding schemes for data represent the
309 most common patterns concisely, reserving extra bits for those that are unusual and
310 unexpected. To invoke another analogy, software developers use version control software to
311 store a project’s history in a shared repository. To save space, the repository only has to
312 store the difference between successive versions, rather than a new copy.

313 As in Hamami, the difference between the informal proof and the formal derivation is really just a
314 process of selective abbreviation. They are both syntactic objects—it’s just that the formal
315 derivation is much longer because it is expressed in a foundational system (usually taken to be a
316 combination of set theory and classical logic). In these data compression and software development
317 analogies, Avigad seems to commit himself to the strong version of the Standard View, that informal
318 proofs are syntactic objects in disguise. However, Avigad does not always follow this line.

319 4. The Semantic Side of the Tension

320 The claim of the present paper is that the tension in the Standard View is there in Avigad’s article as
321 it was in Mac Lane, Azzouni, and the other authors we canvassed above. The Standard View looks
322 implausible because most informal proofs do not seem to work like purely syntactic objects, even
323 though mathematical notation may make them look like syntactic objects. Like other kinds of
324 reason-giving and argument-making, informal mathematical proofs depend on communities of
325 practitioners sharing a common understanding of what moves are permitted within the practice, in
326 virtue of their grasp of the nature of the subject-matter. Mathematicians have some advantages
327 over other communities of reasoners. They can offload some of their thinking to highly efficient
328 notational systems that partially encode the rigour of the practice. Ordinary high-school algebraic
329 notation can serve an example of this: its introduction in the early seventeenth century massively
330 extended the range, depth and reliability of mathematics. Following the implicit rules for forming
331 and manipulating algebraic expressions makes it much easier to avoid making a mistake—but it’s still
332 easy to divide by zero without noticing, unless you pay attention to the meaning of what you’re
333 doing as well as the syntax. Mathematicians can gain clarity and rigour by exploiting the human
334 capacity for visual and kinetic imagination, either by inward imagining or by using diagrams or
335 physical models (this is Avigad’s eighth heuristic). They can exploit Peircean iconicity, because
336 mathematics is about structure, so we can use representations that share structure with the objects
337 under investigation.¹⁸ Increasingly, as the variety of mathematical domains grows, mathematicians
338 can create arguments by moving between different parts of mathematics. Ken Manders calls this
339 the ‘conceptual agility’ of contemporary mathematics:

340 ...hopping a functor to another category any time superfluous details are sensed (homology
341 groups in topology); bringing in details seemingly extraneous to one’s question by a
342 representing functor (group representations in the theory of abstract groups); explaining

¹⁸ See, e.g., De Toffoli (2017), Giardino (2017), and Manders (2008).

343 families of simple number-theoretic facts anyone can see one-by-one, by some hard to
344 master ‘underlying’ abstract structure (Fermat’s problem).¹⁹

345 Here Kevin Buzzard, a mathematician at the heart of the *Lean* proof formalisation project, makes a
346 similar point:

347 Mathematicians [are] so good at instantly switching between the various ‘obviously
348 equivalent’ ways that a mathematician looks at a complicated algebraic object (‘It’s an
349 equivalence relation! Now it’s a partition! Now it’s an equivalence relation again! Let your
350 mental model jump freely to the point of view which makes what I’m saying in this particular
351 paragraph obvious!’), or ‘Matrices are obviously associative under multiplication because
352 functions are associative under composition.’... Some of the proofs we’re writing [in *Lean*]
353 are simply proofs that humans are behaving correctly when using mathematical objects.
354 (Buzzard 2020)

355 Proving that the moves mathematicians make are correct is not the same activity as making those
356 same moves more slowly in a less rich notation.

357 These jumps are helpful precisely because they allow us to bring domain-specific techniques from
358 one area to bear on a problem first found in another. A detour through complex analysis in order to
359 solve a problem in real analysis, or a visit to real analysis to help prove a result in number theory,
360 does not look much like re-coding of syntactic data. It is more like moving from one natural
361 language to another in search of the *mot juste* or looking for legal arguments in a different area of
362 law from the case in hand. Mathematicians translate problems and proof-ideas between different
363 parts of mathematics all the time, and translation of a proof into a foundational idiom is just a
364 special case of this. Rather than choosing a metaphor to describe translation between informal
365 proofs and formal derivations with the aim of preserving the Standard View, it might be less
366 question-begging to work up a general account of intra-mathematical translation on a broad
367 evidence-base, and then see what it says about the special case of translations of proofs into formal
368 derivations.

369 This view of mathematics as a meaningful human reason-giving activity appears in places in Avigad’s
370 article. He notes that mathematical proofs written for human use are robust in the sense that that
371 they can survive errors of syntax and abuses of notation—in fact, abusing notation tactically is an
372 important mathematical skill, but this thought makes no sense if proofs are syntactic items. They’re
373 also insensitive to minor mistakes in calculations or localised reasoning, because readers can correct
374 the errors (as Avigad observes). This can only be because readers understand what the inferences
375 are about and are not simply processing symbol strings syntactically. Some of Avigad’s heuristics—
376 analogy, generalisation, abstraction, exemplification, classification and visualisation—only make
377 sense as strategies for handling meaningful mathematical content. An analogy is not, at the point
378 where it is useful, a syntactic relation. Strategic generalisation is not something a machine can do,
379 not least because very often more than one generalisation is available (for example, if you know
380 something about equilateral triangles, you might generalise to other planar regular polygons or you
381 might generalise to simplexes in higher dimensions). Similarly, noticing that there is a structure in
382 common that is open to axiomatisation, identifying examples that will be both tractable and
383 informative, and classifying in a way that carves the domain at the joints all depend on familiarity
384 with and understanding of mathematical content. It’s true that these activities are preparations for

¹⁹ Unpublished paper. Though this paper is unpublished, it is a developed piece of work and benefits from two decades of refinement. We may therefore treat it as a reasonably reliable expression of Manders’ view.

385 proving rather than parts of proofs. However, it is implausible to suppose that the same
386 mathematical content suddenly switches from being richly significant to become a series of syntactic
387 operations when it is tidied up and arranged into a proof.²⁰ One of Avigad's metaphors makes the
388 very point:

389 Comparing proof to a narrative allows us to draw on intuitions regarding the distinction
390 between the plot and its syntactic presentation. After reading *Pride and Prejudice*, we can
391 reliably make the claims about the characters and their motives, but we cannot reliably
392 make claims about the number of occurrences of the letter 'p.' If the judgment as to the
393 correctness of a proof is more like the former, we have a chance; if it is more like the latter,
394 it is hopeless. (2020, p. 8)

395 Evidently, Avigad favours the former option: thinking about the correctness of a proof is more like
396 making judgments about the plot and characters of a novel, than it is like guessing how many times a
397 letter occurs in the manuscript. This thought, however, undermines the metaphors in his paper that
398 encourage syntactic readings of informal proofs. The relation between the plot of a novel and the
399 typescript is not like data-compression or code-compiling. Turning a plot-and-character idea into a
400 fully written out novel is not a routine translation, in any sense of 'routine', let alone in the sense
401 that Hamami develops in his paper.

402 To fix ideas, consider this example: prove that given any two potatoes, there is a closed loop of the
403 same size and shape on both skins. Like many mathematical proofs in philosophy articles, this is very
404 short and untechnical. It is in these respects quite unlike typical proofs in research mathematics, but
405 it is nevertheless a mathematical proof so whatever we say about mathematical proofs in general
406 must be true of it. The solution is in this²¹ footnote. It is, of course, possible to translate this proof
407 into the language of contemporary geometry and thence into a suitable foundational language, so
408 that it no longer relies on spatial intuition and the inferences are all applications of inferential rules
409 of the general logic of the chosen foundational idiom. The issue is the nature of this translation.
410 According to Hamami, and to Avigad when he follows Hamami, the relation between the proof as
411 offered here and its corresponding derivation is one of data-compression. For this to be true, the
412 proof as written here must already be a syntactic object, and the reasoning in it must be the
413 application of wholly general syntactic rules. It is, of course, possible to conceive of it thus, but in
414 doing so, we would be re-reading it in order to save a philosophical theory from refutation.
415 Alternatively, we could take it to be what it seems to be, namely, a piece of spatial reasoning that
416 works not by manipulating meaningless symbol strings but rather by manipulating imagined potato
417 surfaces.

418 This brings me to another difficulty Hamami's computational picture of the translation between
419 informal proof and formal derivation: it undersells the achievement of the foundational programmes
420 in mathematics. Avigad sometimes wonders aloud²² why critics of the Standard View seem to want

²⁰ Though it can sometimes feel that way. Here is Alain Connes, '...when a mathematician works, he is in fact reflecting up on a certain field, in which he encounters mathematical beings, and ends up playing with them, until they become familiar to him... After a time... either we get nowhere,... or else we manage to get hold of some result. Then begins the onerous task—the obligation to write up for the benefit of the mathematical community a polished article that is as compelling as possible.' (Connes, Lichnerowicz, & Schützenberger, 2001, p. 24f). Connes insists that these are two wholly distinct types of activity. Nevertheless, one supplies materials for the other—untranslated.

²¹ Imagine pushing one potato surface into the other, so that they intersect. The intersection is the required common loop. Proof taken from Tim Gowers' Twitterfeed.

²² Personal communication at the APMP conference in Zurich, 2020.

421 to disregard the great advances in rigour achieved by twentieth-century mathematics. It is
422 wonderful that it is now possible in principle to check any piece of mathematical reasoning
423 mechanically, that mathematicians can pursue piecemeal formalisation as far as they need to in any
424 given case, and that there is a growing library of fully formal proofs of significant theorems.²³
425 However, if we think of mathematics as carried out by humans as syntactic processing, as the data-
426 compression and code-compilation metaphors require, then this becomes less of an achievement. If
427 all mathematical thinking is and always was syntactic processing, then the great foundational
428 programmes did nothing more than set up the compilation tables. The real wonder, the deeply
429 significant achievement, is that it is now possible, with enough work, to check even the most richly
430 human mathematics by machine. It is as if we could judge the coherence of the plot of a novel by
431 asking a computer to count the ‘p’s in the manuscript. Hamami’s view of translation undervalues
432 this achievement and misdescribes the work involved in preparing a proof for mechanical checking.
433 In Avigad’s paper, there is already a hint about how the formalisation of meaningful human
434 mathematics is possible: many of the heuristics described in the observational core of Avigad’s paper
435 simultaneously support the rigour of the informal proof *and* prepare it for translation into a more
436 formal idiom. Following this clue may help us to understand how machine proof assistants are
437 useful to mathematicians, but only if we resist any temptation to begin by positing that human
438 mathematicians were machines all along.

439 5. Conclusion

440 I have argued for two claims in this paper. The first is that the observational core of Avigad (2020) is
441 independent of the Standard View that formalisability is the criterion of correctness for
442 mathematical proofs. In doing so, I distinguished between ‘strong’ versions of the Standard View
443 that claim that sound informal proofs are, in spite of appearances, really syntactic objects and that
444 when mathematicians read them, they’re doing some sort of syntactic processing, and ‘weaker’
445 versions that don’t have that commitment. My second claim is that Avigad, in his (2020), havers
446 between these two versions of the Standard View. He is not alone in this—the tension between
447 these two options is present in the debate from Mac Lane onwards. For the discussion to advance,
448 proponents of the Standard View need to specify which version they endorse.

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²³ For a spectacular recent example, see Castelvechi (2021).

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